Passage: Intractable Conflicts

Understanding intractable conflicts starts with recognizing that sources of intractability are not the same as the original causes of the conflicts. For instance, the conflict in Kashmir is part of a larger set of bilateral conflict issues that have divided India and Pakistan since their joint emergence from the British Empire in the 1940s. Now, that agenda includes nuclear risk reduction and targeting weaponisation programmes, river-based issues, other border issues, regional rivalries, and above all the identity dispute between Muslim homeland Pakistan and secular India. The bilateral issue agenda has ballooned with the passage of time, so that today Kashmir is much more deeply embedded in polarized issues than it was in the late 1940s.

Geography and geopolitics may also promote intractability. Some states lie on the borderline between larger civilizations – Sudan between black and Arab Africa. In other cases, neighbouring wars may engulf a conflict, holding it captive to a resolution of the larger war, as Burundi's conflict was engulfed by the war in neighbouring Congo. And many so-called internal patterns of enmity and amity are shaped by regional power distributions and specific factors such as border disputes, ethnic diasporas, ideological alignments, and neighbouring states whose interests are served by continuing conflict.

There are several schools of thought about the many causes of contemporary civil wars. Intractable conflicts that take place within the borders of one country may be particularly resistant to solution because of the nature of the conflict itself. These conflicts, manipulated as they may be by political agency entrepreneurs - or what Michael Brown calls, "bad leaders" - often involve deep-seated identity and grievance issues as well as a considerable amount of war profiteering by representatives of one group or another. Some analysts stress the role of poverty and the denial of basic human needs as key sources of conflict. The extent to which certain groups in society are systematically discriminated against and/or have their basic needs denied those in power can lay the seeds for conflict, especially if there is no legitimate way to channel these grievances through the political process.

In other cases, however, it is not internal instability that feeds intractability but rather a kind of stasis that develops around the fighting. For instance, a stable and tolerable stalemate makes it easy for sides to settle into comfortable accommodation with persistent warfare that sustains power bases. Continued war is a comfort zone that does not jeopardize either side's core constituency, even though those who suffer and pay the price for continued fighting - especially the civilian targets - are disenchanted with it. In some cases, the intractable character of the conflict even ensures a continued benefit from the conflict raises the question of whether there is such a thing as “happy” intractability, an unbuilt but possibly acceptable status quo.

Intractability can also be the product of polarised, zero-sum notions of identity. Conflicts that overhang over long periods lead to the accumulation of grievances incorporated into each party's version of history. Each side sees itself as a victim and re-enacts repetitive key cultural and religious symbols that potentiate both the sense of resentment and the conflict. In intractable conflicts, violence enters the everyday world of thousands of people and becomes a way of life.

Domestic politics can also promote intractability. Lack of internal coherence in the parties can maintain intractability, especially in democracies, as the conflict becomes part of campaign promises and political considerations create difficulty in making concessions.

Another important factor in intractable conflict settings is the avarice of predatory warlords who profit from the political economy of violence through arms sales, smuggling, and other illicit commercial practices and transactions. As Paul Collier and others argue, it is clear that "conflict pays" in monetary as well as political terms. And the dividends are such that those who are the chief beneficiaries of the war economy may have strong economic incentives to keep the conflict boiling. Nowhere is this more evident than in Angola and Sierra Leone, where civil wars have literally been paid for by the illicit sale of smuggled "blood" diamonds that have eventually found their way into regular commercial markets.

The failure of previous efforts can have a negative impact on possibilities for peace making. The discrediting of an "acceptable" agreement in an earlier phase of negotiation can force a solution off the table despite the fact that may be the only 'salient' solution. A literature of accord becomes a weapon of political warfare, and agreements that are never implemented can lead to cynicism and resistance to peace initiatives.

Changes in the way the parties in a conflict pursue their objectives through political channels can also serve to promote intractability. As parties gain experience in negotiation and in dealing with third parties, they develop a tendency to manipulate talks. A single party may simultaneously pursue very contradictory policies, sowing confusion among adversaries and third parties. Intentional misunderstandings between the parties may serve the purpose of papering over internal discord and factionalism. For this reason, parties may resist any outsider effort to make them clarify their goals. In some cases of conflict, parties become more purposeful and strategic in their behaviour than the intervening third parties. In Bosnia the conflict parties viewed third-party mediation as an opportunity for a double game, seeking alliances with mediators to pursue their version of the mediator’s stated norms and principles. In other cases negotiations become another means of conducting the conflict rather than a means for settling it.